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Cooperative behavior is often assumed to depend on individuals’ characteristics, such
as altruism and reasoning ability. Evidence is mixed about what the precise impact
of these characteristics is, as the subjects of study are generally randomly paired,
generating a heterogeneous mix of the two characteristics. In this study we ex-ante
create four different groups of subjects by factoring their higher or lower than the median
scores in both altruism and reasoning ability. Then we use these groups in order to
analyze the joint effect of the two characteristics on the individual choice of cooperating
and on successful paired cooperation. Subjects belonging to each group play first 10
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games with ten random partners and then three
consecutive 10-round repeated PD games with three random partners. In all games,
we elicit players’ beliefs regarding cooperation using an incentive compatible method.
Individuals with high altruism are more optimistic about the cooperative behavior of the
other player in the one-shot game. They also show higher individual cooperation and
paired cooperation rates in the first repetitions of this game. Contrary to the one-shot
PD games where high reasoning ability reduces the probability of playing cooperatively,
the sign of the relationship is inverted in the first repeated PD game, showing that
high reasoning ability individuals better adjust their behavior to the characteristics of the
game they are playing. In this sense, the joint effect of reasoning ability and altruism
is not linear, with reasoning ability counteracting the cooperative effect of altruism in
the one-shot game and reinforcing it in the first repeated game. However, experience
playing the repeated PD games takes over the two individual characteristics in explaining
individual and paired cooperation. Thus, in a (PD) setting, altruism and reasoning ability
significantly affect behavior in single encounters, while in repeated interactions individual
and paired cooperation reach similarly high levels independently of these individual
characteristics.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality and
perfect information, the only Nash equilibrium of the finitely
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is mutual defection at each
stage of the game. Reasoning by backward induction, a rational
player’s dominant strategy is to defect at the final stage, as is also
the case in the one-shot game. Knowing this, each player should
also defect at the second to last round, and so on, back to the first
stage.
However, some cooperative play is observed, particularly at
the earliest stages, in numerous experimental tests with this game
(Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Cooper et al., 1996; Pothos et al.,
2011, among others). One way to reconcile the theory with the
experimental evidence is to assume some kind of incomplete
information. If one player does not know the true payoffs of the
opponent, for example, and assigns a positive probability that
the other will not defect, mutual cooperation can be sustained
as equilibrium (Kreps et al., 1982). One possible interpretation
of the cooperation observed in experimental games, then, is that
some players are “altruistic,” in the sense that their true payoffs
from cooperation are greater than the given monetary ones, and
players’ types are not common knowledge. Cooperation thus
would be played by altruists. In a repeated game, an alternative
explanation is that some playersmay try to “build a reputation” of
cooperation in order to achieve a higher total payoff in the game.
Both Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Cooper et al. (1996) use
evidence of cooperation in the one-shot PD game as an indicator
that a positive proportion of individuals are actually altruistic1.
They also find that cooperation is higher when the PD is repeated
for a finite number of times, consistent with reputation building.
Players then turn to defection toward the end of the game, even
if at a slower pace than predicted by Kreps et al. (1982). In
their work, altruism is only a hypothesis to explain cooperative
behavior, given that no independent measure is used to classify
subjects as altruistic. However, even if altruists are expected
to cooperate more, cooperation and altruism are not the same
thing. Following Dreber et al. (2014) and Capraro andMarcelletti
(2014), in our experiment we use as a treatment variable an ex-
ante measure of altruism: giving in a Dictator Game. That is, we
define as altruism the willingness to sacrifice one’s own payoff
in order to increase the other’s payoff. Furthermore, we elicit
subjects’ beliefs in the PD games in order to better understand
the relationship between altruism and cooperative behavior.
Several laboratory experiments have been conducted to
analyze whether the cooperators in a repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (RPD) can be identified by some kind of measurable
characteristics. Dreber et al. (2014) find that altruism leads to
more cooperation in a noisy version of the infinitely repeated
PD game only if no cooperative equilibrium exists. However,
altruism does not play any role in determining the outcome
when cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium. Their results
1In Cooper et al. (1996) a player is classified as an altruist (egoist) if he plays
cooperatively more (less) than 50% of the time in 20 one-shot PD games. Andreoni
and Miller (1993) consider any cooperation in the one-shot game as a sign of
altruism.
support the view that social preferences are not important
predictors of cooperation. Rather, individuals seem to cooperate
mainly driven by payoff maximization motives. Using a dictator
game to measure altruism and a standard PD game to measure
cooperation, Capraro and Marcelletti (2014) find that being
recipient of an altruistic act does not increase your probability
of being cooperative with a third party.
We analyze the effect of altruism on cooperation, defined as
the willingness to increase the joint payoffs of yourself and the
other, which can be observed using one-shot and finitely repeated
PD games. According to the Social Value Orientation (SVO)
literature, prosocial individuals tend to maximize outcomes for
both themselves and others (Van Lange et al., 1997). Eliciting
beliefs about partner’s cooperation allows us to tell apart
whether participants classified as altruists in our study cooperate
conditionally, i.e., based on the expectation that the other will
also cooperate, or unconditionally, that is, even if thinking that
the other will defect2.
Individuals’ cognitive ability/intelligence has also been
associated with cooperative play. One natural supposition is
that more intelligent individuals should make more “rational”
choices, exhibiting behavior consistent with game theoretic
predictions, such as the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
(Burks et al., 2009; Proto et al., 2015). Accordingly, these
individuals should be observed to cooperate less in both one-
shot and finitely repeated PD games. The empirical evidence,
however, does not seem to support this conjecture. For instance,
using a meta-study of repeated (PD) experiments run at
numerous universities, Jones (2008, 2013) suggests that the
average intelligence of game participants should be considered
among the most robust factors driving individual cooperation.
Specifically, this author finds that students at schools with higher
average scores in the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) and the
American College Test (ACT) tended to cooperate more often
in a RPD3. Using a sample of 1,000 truck driving students in a
one-shot sequential (PD), Burks et al. (2009) find that subjects
with higher IQ more accurately forecast others’ decisions and
differentiate their actions more strongly given the first-mover’s
choice, exhibiting behavior that is far from the sub-game perfect
equilibrium of the game.
Other experimental studies find mixed evidence regarding
the conjecture about the negative link between cognitive ability
and cooperative play. Yamagishi et al. (2014) find that decisions
coherent with the maximization of self-interest are linked
indeed to higher IQ. However, psychological assessment of the
participants in their study leads to the conclusion that those
classified as “Homo Economicus” might behave in a selfish
2According to the SVO literature, prosocial individuals can be either altruists
(unconditional cooperators) or cooperators (conditional cooperators). Differently
from this literature, we do not identify altruists as unconditional cooperators.
3Jones (2014) increases the information processing necessary to implement
strategies supporting cooperation of the RPD game through random switching
between permutations of the payoff table. This additional strategic complexity
attenuates the relationship between cognitive ability and cooperation observed in
Jones (2008). In a related cognitive load experiment, Duffy and Smith (2014) find
that a decrease in the cognitive load of subjects increases strategic defection near
the end of the RPD game.
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manner only in a situation in which no future consequence
of their choice is expected. These subjects can better assess
the future and adopt long-term strategies. In the same line,
using an experimental design similar to ours but with just one
factor (participants are allocated into two groups according to
their level of intelligence), Proto et al. (2015) find that higher
intelligence groups do not cooperate more in the initial rounds
of an infinitely repeated PD game, but seem to learn better
how to reciprocate their partner’s behavior over time. However,
there are no significant differences in the same design with lower
continuation probability. Also recently and in contrast with Jones
(2008, 2013), Al-Ubaydli et al. (2016) find that cognitive ability
does not predict individual cooperation in a 10-round PD game
but paired cooperation is positively correlated with the average
cognitive ability of the two players. In their study, individuals
with higher cognitive abilities reciprocate cooperation in the
second round of the PD game significantly more than low
cognitive ability subjects, like in Burks et al. (2009).
Given the previous findings, an alternative conjecture is
then that more intelligent individuals better adapt to the
circumstances in strategic situations4.
Our objective in this paper is to test the significance of the joint
effect of cognitive ability and altruism on cooperative behavior in
a series of one-shot and finitely repeated PD games. In order to do
so, both characteristics are implemented as treatment variables,
separating individuals in four distinct groups based on the
interaction of their high/low level of cognitive ability (measured
with the Differential Aptitude Test on Abstract Reasoning), and
their high/low altruistic giving in a Dictator Game (DG). In the
aforementioned literature, altruism or cognitive ability or both
are treated as control variables rather than treatment variables,
or not taken into account. Our 2 by 2 factorial design matches
individuals with similar cognitive ability and level of altruism,
allowing us to neatly observe the effect of these factors on
cooperation. In other words, the effect of a high reasoning ability
individual with high altruism might get diluted if she found for
instance a low intelligence low altruism partner when playing a
RPD. Our study tries to avoid this problem.
Subjects belonging to each group played 10 one-shot PD
games and three 10-round repeated PD games where we elicited
players’ beliefs using an incentive compatible method. Our paper
is the first introducing players’ beliefs to analyze expectations and
behavioral rules in the RPD game under different treatments of
altruism and reasoning ability.
Based on the previous review, in our study we propose the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1:High altruism individuals should cooperate more
in both one-shot and repeated PD.
Given our definition, an altruist should be willing to increase the
other’s payoff at the cost of decreasing her own expected payoff,
4Intelligence and adaptive behavior are found to be separate but related constructs
exhibiting low to moderate correlations depending on the particular measures
(Harrison, 1987; Keith et al., 1987; Platt et al., 1991). The underlying mechanism
behind the relationship between intelligence and adaptive behavior is out of the
scope of our paper.
which is exactly what happens when an individual chooses the
dominated cooperative strategy in our PD games.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals with higher cognitive ability should
more accurately forecast their partner’s actions in both types of
games (one-shot and repeated), and thus be able to differentiate
their behavior accordingly.
We assume that making better predictions is a necessary pre-
condition to adapt successfully to a strategic situation. In line
with Proto et al. (2015), we consider that more intelligent
individuals should be capable of better assessing and adapting
to the environment. Thus, they should better realize the scope
for reputation building in the repeated game as opposed to the
one-shot game.
Hypothesis 3: Reasoning ability should counteract the effect of
altruism in the one-shot game, while it should reinforce it in the
repeated PD game.
Our first two hypotheses propose that, while altruism should
always increase cooperation, reasoning ability should lead
to increased or decreased cooperation depending on the
circumstances. This implies a non-linear interaction between the
two factors.
Our results confirm the two first hypotheses using a clean
experimental design. Reasoning ability is found to indeed
counteract the effect of altruism in the one-shot games, but to
reinforce it only in the first RPD. In general, the effect of the
individual characteristics on the cooperation decision fades out
with the repetition of the RPD game.
The article is organized as follows: Section Methods describes
the experimental design and Section Results presents the results.
Section Discussion discusses the results and concludes.
METHODS
We turn to experimental economics methodology to create
a controlled, saliently motivated and replicable environment
in which to test our hypotheses. As a first step, we used an
experimental setting to measure our subjects’ reasoning ability
and altruism. After creating four different groups according to
the results of these measures, we invited again the same subjects
to the lab for a different experiment. In this second step, subjects
were randomly paired with other subjects of similar reasoning
ability and altruism, without them knowing this information,
and played four sets of (PD) games both one-shot and repeated.
Thus, each subject whose data we present in this study has
participated in two sessions in different days of two consecutive
weeks in December 2014: all sessions of the second experiment
were carried out during the week after the last session of the first
experiment. As the participants did not receive any payment up
to the end of the second session, the attrition rate was low: out
of 178 subjects who participated in the first set of sessions, only
16 did not participate in the second set of sessions. Subjects were
recruited among undergraduate students from different degrees
at Universitat Jaume I (Spain), using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
At the beginning of each session, subjects were given written
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instructions, which were also read aloud by the organizers. Any
remaining questions were privately answered.
At the end of the second session, subjects found out their
actual gains and were privately paid in cash the total amount
obtained in both sessions. Average earnings were around 11e
for the first experiment and around 14e for the second one, and
the sessions lasted 1 and 1 h and a half, respectively. Experiments
were computerized and carried out in a specialized computer lab
(LEE at Universitat Jaume I), using software based on the Z-Tree
toolbox by Fischbacher (2007).
Each of the two experimental designs is described in detail
in the following subsections. Experimental instructions can be
found in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material.
Testing for Reasoning Ability and Altruism
In the first experimental setting, subjects were asked to complete
two tasks. The first task consisted in completing the Abstract
Reasoning part of the Differential Aptitude Test for Personnel
and Career Assessment (DAT-AR for PCA, Bennett et al., 1974).
The Abstract Reasoning (AR) scale of the DAT used in this
experiment is included in the DAT-5 Spanish adaptation by the
publisher TEA (Cordero and Corral, 2006). This test is usually
used as a non-verbal measure of reasoning ability and involves
the capacity to think logically and to perceive relationships in
abstract figure patterns. It is considered as a marker of fluid
intelligence (Colom et al., 2007), the component of intelligence
most related to general intelligence or g factor (McGrew, 2009).
The advantage of this test is that it is quite fast to implement: it
is comprised of 40 multiple-choice items and has a 20 min time
limit. Subjects were informed that they would receive 0.25e for
each right answer.
The second task included a Dictator Game where each
subject played both as dictator (which we more neutrally called
“sender”) and recipient, and then was randomly assigned one
of the two roles. An endowment of 10e was provided to
dictators, who could transfer any amount from 0 to 10e to their
respective anonymous recipient in increments of 0.1e. Subjects
were informed that in this task the recipient would receive no
payment other than the one they chose to give. In our analysis
we use the amount given in the dictator game as a measure
of subjects’ altruism. The dictator game is positively correlated
to altruistic acts in real-life situations (returning money to
subjects in Franzen and Pointner (2013) using the misdirected
letter technique), charitable giving (Benz and Meier, 2008) and
willingness to help in a real-effort task (Peysakhovich et al.,
2014). Additionally, Carpenter et al. (2008) find that the specific
survey questions for altruism used in their study are positively
correlated with DG giving. Using a related concept, Capraro
et al. (2014) find benevolence to be correlated with cooperative
behavior, but their definition of benevolence “to increase the
benefit of someone else beyond one’s own” has no cost to the
“benevolent” player. We consider that a person acts altruistically
if she unilaterally pays a cost c ≥ 0 to increase the benefit of
someone else. More formally, Player 1 is altruist toward Player
2 if she prefers the allocation (x1-c, c) to the allocation (x1, 0),
where c > 0. The larger the c, the more altruist we consider this
subject to be.
After completing the aforementioned tasks, subjects were
divided in four groups according to their reasoning ability
and altruism and called again to the lab. Apart from 16 who
decided not to continue with the second session and just came
separately to the lab to get their gains in the first session, the
rest continued. A subject was classified as “high altruism” if
she chose to transfer more than the median transferred amount
in the dictator game, and as “high reasoning” if her score was
higher than the median score in the DAT-AR test. Following
this classification, the final four treatment groups are named
“Low Altruism and Low Reasoning” (LALR, 42 subjects), “Low
Altruism and High Reasoning” (LAHR, 46 subjects), “High
Altruism and Low Reasoning” (HALR, 42 subjects) and “High
Altruism and High Reasoning” (HAHR, 32 subjects). Therefore,
a total of 162 subjects (81 pairs of players) took part in the
PD sessions. Subjects were not aware at any point of the
existence of the four treatments. We could not control the gender
composition of each treatment but it turned out quite balanced,
always in the 60–40% of females range. In Table 1 we summarize
the treatments implemented.
PD Games
We organized 8 PD sessions, 2 for each treatment group. Each
PD session began with training questions on the PD to make
sure that players fully understood the mechanism of the game.
Then, subjects belonging to the same treatment group were faced
with four consecutive PD tasks. Subjects were informed that they
would be paid according to their decisions in only one of the four
tasks, randomly selected at the end of their session.
One-Shot PD Games
The first task consisted in a sequence of 10 one-shot PD
games against potentially different anonymous opponents using
a strangers-pairing mechanism. No player knew the identity of
the player with whom she was currently paired or the history of
decisions made by any of the other players.
Table 2 shows the payoffs of the one-shot PD game. In each
cell, the first (second) figure denotes the payoff in euros of player
1 (2). Clearly from the Table, “A” represents the decision to
cooperate and “B” not to cooperate.
TABLE 1 | Treatments summary.
Treatment Subjects Female (%) Altruism Reasoning ability
LALR 42 43 Low Low
LAHR 46 40 Low High
HALR 42 59 High Low
HAHR 32 47 High High
TABLE 2 | Payoffs of the one-shot game.
Player 1 Player 2
A B
A (20, 20) (0, 28)
B (28, 0) (10, 10)
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In order to avoid endowment effects across the one-shot
games in this task, we used the RLI (Random Lottery Incentive)
system as payment mechanism. That is, if this task was
selected for payment, only one randomly drawn PD game was
remunerated. We didn’t randomize task order and made all
players play this task first, so that subjects could face a great
number of opponents (up to 10 different ones) and in this way
get some information about the population of players that they
were facing.
Finitely Repeated PD Games
In the last three tasks participants played a repeated PD game,
in which each subject played 10 rounds of the same game
with a given participant using a partners-pairing mechanism.
Therefore, each subject played 10 consecutive rounds with the
same opponent. Players were then anonymously re-matched with
new opponents and played a new RPD lasting again 10 rounds.
At the end of each period in a repetition, subjects were shown
what their opponent had played. However, when players were re-
matched, they were not told anything about the history of play of
their new opponent.
The payoffs of each round for all three RPD tasks are shown
in Table 3. It can be observed that they are just equal to those of
a round of the one-shot game divided by ten.
Beliefs
In order to gather more detailed information on players’ strategic
reasoning, subjects were asked the following questions before
each round of each game:
1.- “Do you think your partner will choose A or B this period?”
2.- “What percentage of players will choose to play A this
period?”
With the first question we elicit the “individual” belief and with
the second one the “social” belief on individual cooperation.
Subjects could earn up to two additional euros for these
questions, according to their answers5.
RESULTS
Before reporting the detailed results related to cooperation
behavior in the (PD) tasks, we first describe the outcomes of the
reasoning ability test and of the Dictator Game, and subjects’
beliefs in the PD tasks.
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the number of observed
correct answers to the 40 multiple choice items in the DAT-AR
test. The mean and the median number of right answers were
23.9 and 24 out of 40, respectively, and the standard deviation
was 6.7. Mean and median number of correct answers are almost
5At each round of the one-shot PD, subjects received 1e for answering the first
question correctly and 1eminus as many cents as the difference (in absolute value)
between their answer to question 2 and the actual percentage of players choosing
cooperation in that round. At each round of the repeated PD the stakes were one
tenth of the one-shot PD, that is 0.1e gain, and one tenth of the difference penalty.
TABLE 3 | Payoffs of the RPD game.
Player 1 Player 2
A B
A (2, 2) (0, 2.8)
B (2.8, 0) (1, 1)
FIGURE 1 | Scores observed in the DAT-AR test.
identical to the ones calculated for the Spanish population of a
comparable age (Cordero and Corral, 2006).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the transfers in the Dictator
Game. About 80% of our subjects gave non-zero amounts.
The mean and median transfer were of 2 and 1.4e out of
10e, respectively, and the standard deviation was almost 2e.
Comparing these results with the range of outcomes in the
dictator game meta-analysis of Engel (2011), our values are
within the range of what is typically observed (dictators on
average give 28.35% of the pie).
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics on reasoning ability and
altruism for subjects included in the four treatment groups. On
average, “high” altruism subjects transfer about 3e more than
“low” altruism ones, while subjects with “high” reasoning ability
answered correctly to about 10 additional questions with respect
to subjects with “low” reasoning ability. Comparing these results
with the general ones for Spain from Cordero and Corral (2006),
19 correct answers correspond to about the 25% percentile of the
DAT-AR scores distribution, and 29 correct answers to about the
75% percentile.
For the pooled data, there is a significantly negative
correlation between altruism and reasoning ability, but it is
quite low (Spearman’s rho of −0.17, p = 0.032). Besides, the
correlation between the two characteristics is not significant
within each group. However, we test for collinearity in our
regression analysis.
Beliefs
Figure 3 shows the percentage of participants whose belief is
that their partner will cooperate in that particular period (the
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FIGURE 2 | Number of subjects per transfer interval in the Dictator
Game.
TABLE 4 | Altruism (A) and Reasoning ability (R) descriptive statistics by
treatment.
Mean S.D Min Max
A R A R A R A R
LALR 0.45 18.74 0.52 4.85 0.0 7 1.5 24
LAHR 0.43 29.67 0.53 3.33 0.0 25 1.5 37
HALR 4.15 18.62 1.24 3.99 2.0 8 8.2 24
HAHR 3.52 29.09 1.19 3.77 2.0 25 6.0 36
“individual belief,” that is, the answer to question 1 reported in
Section Beliefs above) by task, period and treatment. In the one-
shot game high altruism individuals with low reasoning ability
(HALR) have a higher expectation of partner cooperation than
the rest. This difference is significant for the first seven periods
when we compare HALR vs. LALR (with the exception of period
6) and HALR vs. LAHR using a proportion test, and for the first
period when we compare HALR vs. HAHR. The full test statistics
are presented in Table SM2.1 in the Supplementary Material (all
our tests p-values have been Bonferroni corrected to take into
account the problem of false positives in multiple comparisons).
In the first period of each RPD task we observe that HALR
individuals continue to have the most positive expectations
about partner cooperation, while LAHR subjects are the most
pessimistic, this difference being significant for tasks 2, 3, and 4
(see the proportions tests results in Tables SM2.2–SM2.4 in the
Supplementary Material). However, these treatment differences
level off over time within each RPD game.
On average over all periods in a task, high reasoning ability
subjects have a lower expectation of partner’s cooperation in the
one-shot game (Mann-Whitney test z=−4.034 and p= 0.0001),
while there are no significant differences in expectations in the
repeated PDs. This shows that HR individuals’ beliefs are more
consistent with the Nash equilibrium of the game, but only in the
one-shot.
The mean percentage of individuals expected to cooperate
in each period (the “social belief,” that is, the answer to the
second question reported in Section Beliefs), shows a similar
pattern to that of the individual belief (see Figure SM2.1 in the
Supplementary Material).
The elicitation of beliefs allows us to measure the number of
individuals who have correctly guessed their partner’s behavior
in any given period, that is, they expected cooperation and the
other has indeed cooperated, or they expected defection and the
other has defected. Dividing this number by the total number
of individuals in the treatment, we obtain the percentage of
correct beliefs for each task, period and treatment (presented
in Figure 4). According to Hypothesis 2 in the Introduction,
we should observe that individuals with higher cognitive ability
better forecast their partner’s behavior. The percentage of correct
individual beliefs is significantly higher for high reasoning ability
subjects in the first four repetitions of the one-shot game (see
Table SM2.5 in the Supplementary Material) and in the first
period of task 2. In particular, LAHR participants reach 100%
accuracy in almost half of the periods in all tasks, more often
than the other treatments. However, there are no systematic
differences in the remaining periods and tasks (Tables SM2.6–
SM2.8 in the Supplementary Material). In the RPD tasks, the
percentage of correct guesses is above 80% for most periods, for
all treatments.
Result 1: High cognitive ability subjects better forecast their
partner’s behavior in the first repetitions of the one-shot games
and at the beginning of the first RPD. However, there are no
systematic differences in the percentages of correct guesses in the
remaining repetitions of the RPD.
Notice that high altruism individuals with low reasoning
ability less accurately forecast their partner’s behavior in
task 1. This is consistent with the fact that they have a too
optimistic view of their partner’s behavior in the one-shot
game.
Individual Cooperation in Period 1 of Each
Task
In Figure 5 we present the percentage of subjects choosing to
cooperate in period 1 for each task and treatment.
The observed level of cooperation in the very first one-shot PD
game depends on both altruism and reasoning ability.
Result 2: In the first PD game altruism tends to increase
cooperation while reasoning ability tends to decrease it.
Coherently with our Hypotheses 1 and 3, in the first one-
shot PD game high altruism subjects cooperate more than low
altruism subjects, and high reasoning ability subjects cooperate
less than low reasoning ability ones. These differences are
significant using a proportion test, as reported in SM2.12
(period 1).
Result 3: Individual cooperation rates are higher at the
beginning of RPD games than at the beginning of the sequence
of one-shot PD games, particularly for high reasoning ability
subjects.
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FIGURE 3 | Percentage of individuals whose belief is partner cooperation in the current period by task, period and treatment.
FIGURE 4 | Percentage of correct individual beliefs by task, period and treatment.
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FIGURE 5 | Percentage of individuals cooperating in period 1 of each task.
Using a proportion test we obtain that the percentage of
individuals cooperating in period 1 is significantly higher in
all repeated PD tasks than in task 1 for all treatments with
the exception of the HALR treatment (see Table SM2.9 in the
Supplementary Material). After a significant increase in first
period cooperation from task 1 to task 2 especially for high
reasoning ability subjects, the cooperation level remains stable
at the beginning of the remaining tasks. Consistently with our
Hypothesis 2, we observe a more marked difference in behavior
between the one-shot and the repeated tasks for high reasoning
ability individuals.
The observed differences in cooperation for the first one-
shot PD game are no longer significant for the first period
of each repeated game. The high reasoning ability subjects,
who cooperated significantly less at the beginning of the one-
shot games, show no significantly lower cooperation levels
at the beginning of the subsequent tasks (tests results are
available upon request). High reasoning ability individuals seem
to better anticipate the lower cooperation rate that will be
attained in a series of one-shot games with different partners as
opposed to a sequence of repeated interactions with the same
partner.
Individual Cooperation Dynamics
Figure 6 shows individual cooperation percentages by task,
period and treatment.
The percentage of cooperation decreases for all treatments as
the one-shot PD game is repeated (task 1). However, the group
with higher altruism and lower reasoning ability never reaches
a 0% individual cooperation rate (the other treatment groups
reach 0% individual cooperation in periods 5 to 9). Table SM2.10
in the Supplementary Material shows percentages of individual
cooperation in the repetitions of the one-shot game, for all
treatments.
Using a proportion test, in Table SM2.12 in the Supplementary
Material we show that high reasoning ability participants (HR)
cooperate significantly less in the one-shot PD game than
low reasoning ability ones (LR) in the first two repetitions
(column 1). Additionally, the percentage of cooperation is
significantly higher for high altruism subjects (HA) than for
low altruism ones (LA) for several periods, as can be seen in
column 4.
As can be observed in Figure 6, in the RPD tasks individual
cooperation not only is higher at the beginning but also sustained
at around 40% to 60% until the very last period, when it falls
abruptly (see details in Table SM2.11 in the Supplementary
Material). However, last period individual cooperation rates are
still positive, differently from task 1, for most treatments. No
significant treatment effects appear in the RPD tasks, as we had
already observed in our analysis of period one.
Regression Analysis
In order to account for the effect of beliefs and of the stage game
repetitions within each task together with the treatment, we run
random-effects panel logit regressions. Results are reported in
Table 5.
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FIGURE 6 | Percentage of individual cooperation by task, period and treatment.
TABLE 5 | Random-effects panel logit regressions of individual cooperation on treatment, period and beliefs.
Individual cooperation Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
Coeff. Sd.E. Coeff. Sd.E. Coeff. Sd.E. Coeff. Sd.E.
Social belief 0.02*** (0.01)
Individual belief 5.31*** (0.31) 5.15*** (0.28) 5.19*** (0.29)
Female 0.23 (0.34) 0.18 (0.36) 0.01 (0.33) −0.38 (0.33)
Period −0.41*** (0.05) −0.32*** (0.04) −0.31*** (0.04) −0.37*** (0.04)
LAHR −1.52** (0.60) 0.15 (0.49) −0.23 (0.43) −0.39 (0.44)
HALR 1.13*** (0.43) −0.33 (0.50) −0.52 (0.45) −0.30 (0.46)
HAHR −0.24 (0.52) 0.28 (0.53) −0.64 (0.48) −0.60 (0.49)
Constant −2.62*** (0.46) −1.64*** (0.42) −0.84** (0.39) −0.17 (0.41)
N 1620 1620 1620 1620
Wald Chi2 96.72*** 295.07*** 341.80*** 320.63***
***Coefficient significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%. Standard errors in parentheses.
The variables used are the following:
- Individual cooperation: dependent variable. Takes value 1
when the individual decides to cooperate in the current period,
0 otherwise.
- Social belief: individual expectation on the percentage of
subjects cooperating in the current period and session. Ranges
from 0 to 100.
- Individual belief: takes value 1 if the individual expects the
partner to cooperate in the current period, 0 otherwise.
- Female: takes value 1 if the subject is female, 0 otherwise.
- Period: takes values 1 to 10 in each task.
- LAHR/HALR/HAHR: dummy variables that take value 1 for
the corresponding treatment, 0 otherwise.
In the regression for task 1 (the one-shot PD game) we consider
“social belief” more appropriate than “individual belief” as a
regressor, given that the individual is not always playing with a
same partner.
The baseline treatment is “Low Altruism and Low Reasoning”
(LALR). Within the “Low Altruism” subjects, the treatment with
“High Reasoning” (LAHR) shows significantly lower cooperation
in the one-shot PD game. On the opposite, a high level of
altruism significantly increases the probability of cooperating for
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individuals characterized by “Low Reasoning” ability (HALR vs.
the baseline LALR). The joint effect of high reasoning ability and
high altruism appears to be null. In fact, there are no significant
differences in cooperation between HAHR and LALR subjects,
which could be due to the fact that the effects of a higher
reasoning ability and a higher altruism go in opposite directions.
This is coherent with the interaction effect we anticipated in
Hypothesis 3.
We also observe that the higher the expectation on
the percentage of players cooperating in that round, the
higher individual cooperation. Moreover, each additional period
significantly reduces the likelihood of cooperation. Gender has
no significant effect.
Treatment effects disappear in the RPD tasks: none of the
estimated coefficients for each of the three treatment dummies
is significantly different from zero. In these tasks, thinking that
the partner will cooperate significantly rises the probability of
cooperation. There is a negative significant effect of period.
We can directly include reasoning ability and altruism
measurements in these regressions rather than using a dummy
for each group. Results are reported in Table 6. The variables
used to measure reasoning ability and altruism are the
following:
- Reasoning ability: number of correct answers in the DAT-RA
test. Ranges from 7 to 37.
- Altruism: euros transferred to the recipient in the dictator
game. Ranges from 0 to 8.2.
Although the correlation between reasoning ability and altruism
was weak, we tested for collinearity in the estimated models.
Results of these tests are reported in Table SM2.13 in the
Supplementary Material. The Variance Inflation Factors are quite
low (slightly above 1) for all regressors, indicating that there is no
cause for concern.
For task 1 we obtain that reasoning ability has a significant
negative effect while altruism increases the likelihood of
cooperating, thus extending our Result 2 beyond the first period
to all the one-shot PD games. The effect of the remaining
variables is robust to the replacement of the treatment dummies
by cognitive ability and altruism variables.
Result 4: In the one-shot PD games, the effect of reasoning
ability on the likelihood of cooperation is negative while that of
altruism is positive. Additionally, individual beliefs and period
also significantly affect the cooperation decision. Gender is not
relevant.
In task 2 reasoning ability continues to be significant for
explaining cooperation. However, note that the direction of
the effect is the opposite, that is, higher abstract reasoning
leads to less cooperation in the one-shot PD and to more
cooperation in RPD, thus confirming our Hypothesis 3. As we
pointed out above, it seems that subjects with higher reasoning
ability better recognize the different nature of the games
played and the relatively lower opportunities of coordinating
on cooperation that playing with a changing partner provides.
Thus, these subjects seem to better adjust their behavior to the
environment.
Result 5: The effect of reasoning ability on cooperation is
negative in the one-shot games but positive in the first RPD task.
In tasks 3 and 4 neither reasoning ability nor altruism affect
cooperation. Instead, the belief that the partner will cooperate
significantly increases the likelihood of cooperating in all tasks. In
fact, this belief turns out to be highly correlated with past partner
cooperation (which we have not included in the regression for
this reason: Spearman’s rho of 0.76, p < 0.001). Again, period has
a significantly negative effect and gender plays no role.
Result 6: Experience with the RPD game takes over individual
characteristics of the subjects in explaining their decision.
While reasoning ability significantly predicts cooperation
behavior the first time the repeated game is played (task 2),
individual characteristics do not seem to play a role when
participants gain experience facing the RPD a second and a third
time (tasks 3 and 4).
Unconditional Cooperation
Using the information on beliefs, we computed the percentage
of individuals who cooperate “unconditionally,” that is, even if
expecting defection, for each period of each task. The result is
that very few individuals choose to cooperate thinking that the
partner will defect. In the one-shot, on average only 1.5% of low
altruism and 2.8% of high altruism participants’ decisions are
A/B. In the repeated tasks, on average <6% of both high and
low altruism subjects’ decisions are unconditionally cooperative.
We interpret this result as evidence of very low unconditional
cooperation. In fact, taking into account the payoff table of the
game, we can observe that even a high altruism subject would find
it hard to cooperate unconditionally. On average high altruism
subjects were willing to sacrifice 4e out of 10e in the dictator
game, while in the one-shot PD they should give up 10e and get
nothing if they cooperate thinking that the partner is not going to
cooperate. In fact no player gave up the whole 10e endowment
in the DG.
Result 7: There is scarce evidence of unconditional cooperation,
even for high altruism subjects.
Paired Cooperation
By paired cooperation we refer to the situation where both
members of a pair simultaneously decide to cooperate in a given
period, thus obtaining the cooperative payoff of the Prisoners’
Dilemma.
As can be seen in Figure 7, successful paired cooperation is
obviously much lower in the one-shot than in the repeated PD.
Only altruists show some positive cooperation at the beginning
of task 1. The difference in paired cooperation between low and
high altruism pairs is significant for the first one-shot game (z =
−2.78 and p= 0.003). All treatments increase paired cooperation
at the beginning of the RPD games, particularly high reasoning
ability subjects which show steep and significant increases in
the first two periods. Specifically, we find significant differences
comparing the level of paired cooperation in period 2 vs. period 1
for high reasoning ability pairs (at 5% in tasks 2 and 3, marginally
in task 4; test details in Table SM2.14 in the Supplementary
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TABLE 6 | Random-effects panel logit regressions of individual cooperation on individual characteristics, period and beliefs.
Individual cooperation Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
Coeff. Sd.E. Coeff. Sd.E. Coeff. Sd.E. Coeff. Sd.E.
Reasoning ability −0.09*** (0.03) 0.06** (0.03) 0.04 (0.02) −0.00 (0.02)
Altruism 0.20** (0.09) 0.00 (0.09) −0.01 (0.08) −0.04 (0.09)
Social belief 0.02*** (0.01)
Individual belief 5.31*** (0.31) 5.11*** (0.28) 5.17*** (0.29)
Female 0.31 (0.36) 0.20 (0.36) 0.02 (0.33) −0.36 (0.33)
Period −0.41*** (0.05) −0.32*** (0.04) −0.31*** (0.04) −0.37*** (0.04)
Constant −1.13 (0.80) −3.03*** (0.76) −2.00*** (0.70) −0.36 (0.71)
N 1620 1620 1620 1620
Wald Chi2 91.06*** 297.67*** 342.84*** 319.96***
***Coefficient significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%. Standard errors in parentheses.
FIGURE 7 | Percentage of paired cooperation by task, period and treatment.
Material). There are no other treatment differences in reaching
and sustaining high cooperation. Tasks 2 and 3 present levels of
paired cooperation close to 40%, and task 4 reaches 60%.
Result 8: In the first one-shot game high altruism subjects
exhibit higher levels of paired cooperation than low altruism
ones.
Result 9: In the RPD game high reasoning ability subjects
significantly increase paired cooperation in the first two periods,
all treatments attaining and sustaining similarly high levels
until one period before the last of each repetition, when
cooperation crumbles.
DISCUSSION
We study cooperative behavior in (PD) games using a neat 2 by
2 factorial design, considering high vs. low altruism and high
vs. low reasoning ability. As in all the previous experiments
with these games, we find evidence of cooperation in both one-
shot and finitely repeated (PD). In particular, we confirm the
result by Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Cooper et al. (1996)
that a certain amount of cooperative play appears to be due to
the altruistic nature of subjects. In fact, by using an external
measure of altruism (giving in a Dictator’s Game), we show
that altruism positively affects the likelihood of cooperation in
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the one-shot PD games. Moreover, high altruism players seem
to be more optimistic about their partners’ behavior and they
cooperate mainly thinking that their partner will also cooperate.
Successful paired cooperation is very low in the one-shot games,
with high altruism pairs being the only ones to reach positive
levels.
As in the aforementioned studies and coherent with the
“reputation building” hypothesis, we find that both individual
and paired cooperation rates are much higher (40–60%) in
the repeated PD games, and sustained for almost all periods,
only to fall sharply in the last period of each task. Thanks
to the elicitation of players’ beliefs, we show that in our
experiment cooperation is almost never unconditional: even
altruistic subjects hardly cooperate if they think that their
partner is going to defect. Altruism does not significantly
increase neither individual nor paired cooperation in
RPDs.
Interestingly, the effect of reasoning ability on individual
cooperation changes sign depending on the type of PD game.
Reconciling part of the previous literature and consistently
with Burks et al. (2009)’s result for sequential PD, higher
cognitive ability subjects appear to better adapt to the particular
game played. In particular, they more accurately forecast their
partner’s behavior in the first repetitions of the one-shot
games and at the beginning of the first RPD. Coherently,
they tend to cooperate significantly less in the one-shot PD,
as hinted in the lower continuation probability treatments of
Proto et al. (2015). Also, they are more likely to cooperate
in the first RPD, in line with what Jones (2008) found in his
analysis using average intelligence scores. Differently to Al-
Ubaydli et al. (2016), where paired cooperation is predicted by
cognitive ability whereas individual cooperation is not, we do
not find fundamental differences between individual and paired
cooperation.
Reasoning ability is found to counteract the effect of
altruism in the one-shot game. In fact, the joint effect of
high reasoning ability and high altruism on the likelihood
of cooperation appears to be no different from that of
low reasoning ability and low altruism. However, while low
reasoning ability individuals display similar behavior in both
one-shot and RPD games, high reasoning ability subjects
appear to better understand the nature of the one-shot (PD),
changing then their decisions in the repeated version of the
game.
Individual characteristics, however, fast reduce their weight
in affecting subjects’ decisions. While both reasoning ability
and altruism explain individual cooperation in the one-shot
PD and reasoning ability continues to be significant in the
first RPD game, both characteristics become irrelevant as
explicative variables when subjects gain experience in the RPD
game. Instead, the variables affecting individual cooperation are
period and subject beliefs. The latter could still be mediated
by subject type, but in a more dynamic and adaptive way,
as beliefs in the RPD are highly correlated with past partner
cooperation. With experience in the RPD, reached and sustained
cooperation end up being similar among all groups. Thus,
in a (PD) setting, altruism and reasoning ability significantly
affect behavior in a situation in which no future consequence
of choices is expected. This effect appears to be diluted when
building a reputation can be used to reach higher payoffs. Indeed,
transforming a social relationship into repeated interactions
appears to be key to achieve mutual cooperation (Axelrod,
1984).
As future research, personality traits could also be added
as determinants of cooperation, such as agreeableness or
extraversion, as in Pothos et al. (2011), Proto et al. (2015), or
Kagel and McGee (2014). They could be added as controls rather
than as treatment variables, because the latter option wouldmuch
complicate the treatment structure and impose high demands
on the number of participants. An efficient alternative would
be to program algorithmic players with a selection of frequently
studied strategies and make them interact with human players,
as in Hilbe et al. (2014). Also, having an increased age and
culture variability could add insights on the determinants of
cooperation.
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